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Abstract
Manipulationism holds that information about the results of inter-
ventions is of utmost importance for scientific practices such as causal
assessment or explanation. Specifically, manipulation provides informa-
tion about the stability, or invariance, of the (causal) relationship between
(variables) X and Y : were we to wiggle the cause X, the effect Y would
accordingly wiggle and, additionally, the relation between the two will not
be disrupted. This sort of relationship between variables are called ‘in-
variant empirical generalisations’. The paper focuses on questions about
causal assessment and analyses the status of manipulation. It is argued
that manipulationism is trapped in a dilemma. If manipulationism is read
as providing a conceptual analysis of causation, then it fails to provide a
story about the methods for causal assessment. If, instead, manipula-
tionism is read as providing a method for causal assessment, then it is
at an impasse concerning causal assessment in areas where manipulations
are not performed. Empirical generalisations are then reassessed, in such
a way that manipulation is not taken as methodologically fundamental.
The paper concludes that manipulation is the appropriate tool for some
scientific (experimental) contexts, but not for all.
1 Introduction
Manipulationist theorists, in slightly different ways, hold the view that infor-
mation about the results of interventions is of utmost importance for scientific
practices such as causal assessment or explanation.1
More specifically, the information that manipulation is meant to provide con-
cerns the stability, or invariance, of the (causal) relationship between (variables)
X and Y . This means that, put in non-technical terms, were we to wiggle the
putative cause X, the putative effect Y would accordingly wiggle and, addition-
ally, the relation between the two will not be disrupted. This does not entail
that wiggling X will necessarily make Y wiggle, but that, if it does, we will
be interested in whether the relationship between X and Y is invariant in the
sense sketched above. Relationships of this sort are called invariant empirical
1The main theoriser and partisan of the manipulatinist (or interventionist) account is
no doubt Jim Woodward (see Woodward (2002, 2003, 2010)). The approach has been also
endorsed and used for various purposes by many other scholars, for instance Baumgartner
(2009); Glennan (2010); Hausman (1997); Hausman and Woodward (2004); Waters (2007);
Woodward and Hitchcock (2003).
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generalisations and have the characteristic of being exploitable for explanation
or for causal assessment. In this paper, I focus on questions related to causal
assessment rather than explanation. That is to say, I will be concerned with
what makes empirical generalisations causal rather than with what makes them
explanatory.
In §2, I present the manipulationist account of empirical generalisations. I
make it clear that manipulation is central for the account. The rest of the paper
investigates the status of manipulation for questions of causal assessment.
In §3 I argue that the manipulationist account is trapped in a dilemma. If the
project is read as contributing to the conceptual analysis of causality, then it is at
an impasse concerning the methods for causal assessment, i.e. no story about how
to establish whether X causes Y is offered. If the project is read as contributing
to the methodology of causality, then a second dilemma opens up. Strictly
interpreted, manipulationism fails to offer methods for causal assessment in
scientific areas where manipulations are not performed. Charitably interpreted,
instead, manipulationim becomes so vague as to be an unilluminating—and even
misleading—rationale underpinning causal reasoning in both experimental and
nonexperimental contexts.
In the light of the previous discussion, in §4 I reassess empirical generalisa-
tions. The core of agreement with manipulationist theorists is that empirical
generalisations are indeed change-relating relations and that for empirical gen-
eralisations to be causal they indeed have to be invariant, albeit in a sense that
does not take manipulations as methodologically fundamental. The importance
of the change-relating character of empirical generalisation has to do with the
rationale underpinning causal reasoning: it is not manipulation but variation
that does this job.
2 Manipulationist Empirical Generalisations
To understand the manipulationist project, we need to spell out the notions of
(i) empirical generalisation, (ii) invariance, (iii) intervention, and the relations
they stand with respect to each other.
An empirical generalisation is a relation between variables that has the char-
acteristic of being change-relating or variation-relating: changes in the putative
causal-variable X are associated with changes in the putative effect-variable Y .
Of course, the problem of distinguishing causal from spurious or accidental gen-
eralisations immediately arises. We could hit upon a change-relating relation
that is accidental: an increased number of storks might be statistically associ-
ated with an increased number of births, but arguably there is no causal link
between these two variables. Or, a change-relating relation might be spurious:
yellow fingers might be statistically associated with lung cancer but this is the
case because they are effects of a common cause, that is cigarette smoking.
Change-relating relations have to show a certain invariability or stability
in order to be causal (or to be explanatory—this falls outside the scope of
the paper). Briefly put, this means that empirical generalisations have to be
invariant under intervention or under a sufficiently large class of changes.
There are two different types of changes we might be interested in. The
first sort of changes involves background conditions, whereas the second sort
of changes is exactly those that establish invariance. The former, also called
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‘resilience’ by Skyrms (1980) or ‘context-unanimity’ by Eells (1991), establishes
some kind of stability of a relationship across different background conditions.
The latter, instead, requires manipulating the variables figuring in the relation-
ship itself, and we will call the generalisation invariant, roughly speaking, if
changing values of the cause-variable changes values of the effect-variable, and
yet, the relationship between the cause and effect-variables is not disrupted.
This is the sort of invariance required for empirical generalisations to be causal.
Invariant generalisations are then used to ask counterfactual questions about
what would happen to the effect, had the cause been different.
However, in order to evaluate the effects of manipulations, not all counter-
factuals will do. Relevant counterfactuals are those that describe outcomes of
interventions. Consider an empirical generalisation between X and Y . An in-
tervention I on X has to have three characteristics: (i) the change in the value
of X is totally due to the intervention; (ii) the intervention will affect the value
of Y , if at all, just through the change in the value of X; (iii) the intervention
is not correlated with other possible causes of Y (other than X). Interventions
serve to establish whether changes in the cause will bring about changes in the
effect, and yet the relation between the cause and the effect remains unaltered.
If this is the case, then invariant empirical generalisations are in fact causal in
character.
Here is a stock example from physics (discussed, inter alia, in Woodward
(2003)). Consider the ideal gas law, which states that the state of an amount of
gas is determined by its pressure P , volume V , and temperature T : PV = nRT ,
where n is the number of moles of gas and R the universal gas constant. This
empirical generalisation is invariant under a whole range of interventions on the
temperature. Therefore the generalisation correctly describes how manipula-
tions or interventions on the temperature of gas would affect the gas pressure,
holding fixed the gas volume. Because this empirical generalisation is invariant,
it is potentially exploitable for manipulation and control. In fact, we do not
need to actually perform such interventions, but if we did, then we could see
how the effect-variable would change upon interventions on the cause-variable,
and the relation between the cause- and effect-variable remain stable.
Here is an illustration from biology. Consider Dawkin’s fictious gene R
(discussed in Woodward (2010)): when variant r is present, individuals have
dyslexia and are unable to learn to read; when variant r′ is present, individuals
can learn and read normally. The relation between the gene R and the ability
to learn and read is not a very stable one, however. In fact, differences in
background conditions (such as schooling or culture), will disrupt the relation
between R and learning and reading. In other words, outcomes in learning and
reading are not dependent on manipulations on the gene R. This has to be
contrasted, instead, with more stable relationships involving other genes, for
instance for eye colors or for external sexual characteristics.
In sum, empirical generalisations can be exploited for explanation or causal
assessment insofar as they are invariant under intervention. Causal assessment,
in particular, amounts to asking counterfactual questions about the outcomes
of interventions of the following sort: were we to manipulate the putative cause
X, the putative effect Y would accordingly change, and the relation between
the two would not be disrupted as a consequence of the manipulation on X. In




The manipulationist account, I now argue, is caught in a dilemma. The dilemma
arises because the manipulationist account can be given two readings: concep-
tual and methodological. First, according to the conceptual reading, the account
aims to provide identity conditions for causal relations; the sought solution is
that X causes Y if, and only if, manipulations on X would accordingly yield
changes to Y . Second, according to the methodological reading, were manipu-
lations on X to yield changes on Y , then we would be entitled to infer that X
causes Y .2
Those two readings of manipulationisms lead to a dilemma. In the first
case—that is if the project is conceptually read—manipulationism turns out
to be unilluminating as to the methods to use for causal assessment. In the
second case—that is if the project is methdodologically read—then a second
dilemma opens up: (a) strictly interpreted, methodological manipulationism
is not in a position to offer a solution in domains where it is not possible to
intervene (typically, the social sciences, but also astronomy); (b) charitably
interpreted, the requirement of manipulation becomes so vague as to be not
only unilluminating, but also misleading, as to the rationale underpinning causal
reasoning.
Ultimately, the dilemma mirrors a more profound problem in the philoso-
phy of causality: the relation between epistemology/methodology and meta-
physics. Two remarks are in oder. First, specific questions (epistemologi-
cal/methodological and metaphysical) ought not to be conflated, and instead
call for appropriate and distinct answers. That is to say, we should not give a
metaphysical answer to a methodological question, and vice-versa. Second, it is
vital to investigate how metaphysical issues have a bearing on epistemological
and methodological ones, and vice-versa. However, this can be done only inso-
far as different types of questions and of answers are kept distinct. With these
caveats in mind, let us now analyse the horns of the dilemma.
3.1 Horn 1: Conceptual Manipulationism
According to the conceptual reading of manipulationism, X causes Y if, and only
if, manipulations on X accordingly yield changes to Y . This, notice, amounts
to giving identity conditions for causal claims, and consequently the project
contributes to the analysis of the concept of causation. Manipulation is here
the concept in terms of which causation is cashed out. Under this reading,
manipulationism says what has to be true if X causes Y .
If this reading is correct, then manipulationism is unilluminating as regards
the methods to establish whether in fact X causes Y . Nevertheless, it is de-
sirable to have a conceptual analysis of causation that goes hand in hand with
methodology. Once we know what a causal relation between X and Y amounts
2Another strong proponent of the quandary above is Strevens (2007, 2008), who distin-
guishes between conceptual manipulationism and explanatory manipulationism. Given that
I focus on questions of causal assessment rather than explanation, I prefer using the more
general term ‘methodological manipulationism’.
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to, it helps a great deal to know how to find out what causes what. Conversely,
if conceptual analysis and methodology are entirely disconnected, then our un-
derstanding and practice of causal inference are too fragmented to be successful.
Many objections to standard accounts of causation (probabilistic, counterfac-
tual, regularity, interventionist) stem from the fact that (i) epistemological,
methodological and metaphysical questions are conflated and that (ii) most of-
ten the bearing of the epistemology/methodology side on the metaphysics side
(and vice-versa) have not been thoroughly investigated (on this point, see also
Cartwright (2007)).
Thus, once we endorse the idea of having coherent (rather than disconnected)
methodological and conceptual accounts of causation, then the only possible
methodological candidate, under the conceptual reading of manipulationism, is
a methodology based on manipulations. In this case, we have to investigate
Horn 2 below, which discusses precisely methodological manipulationism.
It is worth noting that manipulationist theorists (and particulary Wood-
ward) claim that the project is methodological rather than conceptual. Thus,
Horn 2 below appears to be most relevant, at least prima facie. Nervertheless, as
the discussion of Horn 2 will reveal, the objections to the methodological read-
ing do press the manipulationist theorist back into Horn 1, whence its relevance
for our purposes.
Yet, if escaping Horn 1 leads to Horn 2, and in turn, the branches of Horn 2
loop back into Horn 1, then it seems that the manipulationist is stuck between
a rock and a hard place. But there is a way out: my reassessment of empirical
generalisations offered in §4.
3.2 Horn 2: Methodological Manipulationism
According to the methodological reading, the perspective is rather reversed:
were manipulations on X to yield changes on Y , then we would be entitled to
infer that X causes Y . Manipulation is here a method to establish whether
X causes Y . There is another dilemma opening up now. The requirement of
manipulation can be either (a) strictly interpreted, or (b) charitably interpreted.
Horn (a): The strict interpretation
Strictly interpreted, manipulationism prescribes the following. In order to know
whether X causes Y , perform an intervention on X, hold fixed anything else,
and see what happens to Y .
The typical situation where this happens is the controlled experiment. Put
it in simple terms, in a controlled experiment we compare results obtained from
two groups: the experimental and the control group. Those are similar in all
relevant respects, except for the putative cause, which undergoes manipulation
in the experimental but not in the control group. The experimenter can then
assess the influence of the putative cause X on the putative effect Y (i) by
holding fixed any other possible influence of factors other than X, and (ii) by
varying only the putative cause. Thus, in a controlled experiment, manipulation
is indeed the key tool to establish causal relations.
Let me make clear what the status of manipulation is. Manipulation is a
tool to get to know what causes what. It is also worth noting that the con-
trolled experiment is here oversimplified and all the difficulties of experimental
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design are overlooked. Identifying the right or best groups (of people or any
other type of units) to include in the experiment, choosing the right or best
intervention to perform, and assessing the effects of such intervention are all far
from being trivial and obvious tasks. Randomisation, the controlled experiment
par excellence, is indeed simple in principle, but not in practice. In practice,
experimental design is a complex and delicate thing, having its own research
tradition tracing back at least to the seminal work of Fisher (1935).
The problem, however, is that most situations in social science (and some ex-
ist in natural science too, e.g. astronomy) are not like controlled experiments. In
observational contexts in social science we need methods to find out what causes
what without resorting to manipulation. The problem isn’t new at all. Early
methodologists in social science recognised this difficulty already in the Sixties.
For instance, Blalock (1961), trained in mathematics and physics, promptly ad-
mitted that well-designed experiments could allow the scientist to make causal
inferences based on the outcomes of manipulations “with some degree of confi-
dence” and “with a relatively small number of simplifying assumptions” (ibidem,
p. 4). Blalock then noticed that this isn’t the case when scientists have to deal
just with observational data. The question is not whether in principle the same
rules of inference can be applied, but how practical difficulties can be overcome
in order to make reliable causal inferences on the basis of data coming from
nonexperimental studies.
This is not to say that the social sciences do not perform interventions at
all. Policy interventions, for instance, are indeed interventions, but the status of
manipulation is here different than the one in controlled experiments discussed
earlier. Policy interventions are based on a causal story, i.e. on valid empirical
generalisations. The results of policy interventions may then lead us to further
confirm or to question the validity of the empirical generalisation. Thus, manip-
ulation is not a tool to find what causes what. Instead, we ‘manipulate’ because
we know what causes what (to the best of our knowledge). In other words,
manipulation is a consequence of a causal story established (usually) in absence
of interventions strictu sensu. Witness for instance Birkland (2010, p. 241):
If the participants in policy making can at least approximate goal
consensus, then the next thing they must do is to understand the
causal theory that underlies the policy to be implemented. A causal
theory is a theory about what causes the problem and what inter-
vention (i.e. what policy response to the problem) would alleviate
that problem. Without a good causal theory it is unlikely that a
policy design will be able to deliver the desired outcome. [Emphases
in the original.]
The manipulationist will then rebut that, to find out what causes what, we
don’t have to actually intervene—an ideal manipulation will do. In fact, the
manipulationist thesis says that were we to intervene on the cause, the effect
would accordingly change. Here are my replies to the objection.
First, some ideal interventions may not make any (physical) sense. For
instance, imagining an intervention that would double the orbit of the moon
(assuming Newtonian gravitational theory and mechanics) to see what would
happen to the tides goes far beyond an ideal—in the sense of physically possi-
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ble—intervention (Woodward, 2003, p.131). An intervention that is not phys-
ically possible—albeit ideal—must be conceptual. If we imagine moving the
moon in a way that such and such changes on the tides will result, this spurs
from our (already established) causal knowledge, but is not evidence to establish
a causal relation between the moon and the tides.
Consequently, it is reasonable to suspect that the manipulationist project
(also) has a conceptual flavour. This suspicion is reinforced by claims Woodward
makes, such as “my aim is to give an account of the content or meaning of various
locutions such as X causes Y ” (Woodward, 2003, p.38). However, in this way,
the manipulationist is in a loop that sticks her back into Horn 1 discussed earlier.
Second, some other ideal interventions cannot be tested and, therefore, causally
evaluated. For instance, Morgan and Winship (2007, p.280) supported the ar-
gument that attributes such as gender can be ideally manipulated thus:
[. . . ] the counterfactual model could be used to motivate an attempt
to estimate the average gain an employed black male working full
time, full year would expect to capture if all prospective employers
believed him to be white.
However there is no way of testing such ‘thought-experiments’ against real
data. This, again, raises the suspicion that manipulationism is (also) a thesis
about the meaning of causation. This, again, brings the manipulationist back
to Horn 1.
Third, and most importantly, if the manipulationist stresses the counter-
factual aspect of the thesis (‘were we to intervene . . . ’), then she is definitively
providing a conceptual analysis of causation. The manipulationist is in fact stat-
ing what must be true about the relationship between X and Y , if X causes
Y . ‘What must be true’ corresponds to providing the meaning—and therby
a conceptual analysis—of ‘cause’ in locutions such as ‘X causes Y ’. Choosing
whether manipulation, or other notions, supplies the meaning of ‘cause’ may
depend on our a priori intuitions about causation as well as on an analys of
the scientific practice—that’s beyond the point at stake. The manipulationist
theorist is indeed free to hold such a conceptual account, appealing to the best
arguments she can produce. But the fact is, even if the conceptual story (‘what
must be true’) is accepted, no methodological story (‘how to know whether it is
in fact true’) is offered. Thus, the manipulationist is irriversibly brought back
to Horn 1.
Horn (b): The charitable interpretation
Charitably interpreted, manipulationism does not prescribe that the agent in-
tervenes to find out what causes what. If the agent cannot manipulate, Nature
will will do it for us. Thus, once Nature has manipulated for us, causal assess-
ment is about evaluating changes (or variations) in the putative effect Y due to
changes (or variations) in the putative cause X. This is roughly what happens,
for instance, in ‘natural experiments’ in economics or epidemiology. In these
observational contexts the assignment of treatment is done ‘by Nature’ rather
than ‘by the experimenter’. Two remarks are immediately in order.
First, even if Nature can in principle manipulate (or randomise) for us,
we need tools to find out whether Nature did in fact manipulate and, if so,
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whether the manipulation was effective. This means, eventually, that we have
to establish what causes what in nonexperimental situations. Notice that this
is exactly the kind of impasse that resulted from the stric reading of Horn
(a) discussed earlier. Invariance under intervention (strictly interpreted) then
turns out to be too strong a requirement for causal assessment of empirical
generalisations in nonexperimental contexts. No wonder, then, that the need
for a weaker version of invariance, i.e. not based on manipulation, come from
the quarters of manipulationists themselves: this is Woodward’s notions of weak
invariance and of possible-cause generalisations to be discussed later in §4.
Second, the charitable reading of methodological manipulationism suggests
that what is of utmost importance is to evaluate whether changes in the pu-
tative effect Y occur as a consequence of changes in the putative cause X. If
this is correct, then manipulation cannot be interpreted as providing the ra-
tionale underpinning causal reasoning. Such interpretation is misleading and
disingenous. Let me elaborate this idea further.
If we let manipulation underpin causal reasoning, the risk is to create another
‘gold standard’, analogous to randomised clinical trials (RCTs) in evidence-
based medicine. But RCTs aren’t, by all means, the gold standard either.
Criticisms of the alleged superiority of RCTs abound. Here is a notable one.
Thompson (2011) is concerned that statistical methods alone cannot be a reli-
able tool for causal inference. More specifically, in his argument, the differences
between trials in biomedical contexts and trials in agricultural settings—the
origin of the Fisherian theory—are the key to understand why randomisation is
by and large successful in the latter but not in the former.
The alleged superiority of manipulationist methods over observational ones
is based on the idea that non-experimental models try to (actually, struggle
to) reproduce the same methodology. Whence the widespread belief that ex-
perimental methods are intrinsically better than nonexperimental ones. This
idea is however questionable. Each scientific method—be it experimental or
observational—has its own virtues (and weakenesses). Consequently, the good-
ness of a method has to be evaluated in the context in which it is used. If we
cannot manipulate, it makes no sense to say that a controlled experiment would
have been better than a cohort study. What does make sense is, for instance,
questioning whether the chosen sampling method for the cohort study at stake
was good or not in the given context. Methods are to be evaluated for the job
they are supposed to do, not with respect to an alleged gold standard.
The motivation to have a rationale underpinning causal reasoning is to unify
different methods under a principle that embraces them all. However, manipu-
lation cannot do that—the impasse that ensued from the strict reading (Horn
(a)) made the point. But there is indeed one rationale that unifies manipula-
tionist and observational methods as methods for causal inference: this is the
rationale of variation that I shall present next in §4.
To sum up. Manipulationism can be read as contributing to a conceptual analy-
sis of causation or as contributing to causal methodology. I argued that manipu-
lationism is trapped in a dilemma because if the ‘conceptual’ reading is preferred,
then the account is at an impasse with the methodology side. Conversely, if the
‘methodological’ reading is preferred, then either manipulationism is too strict
and leaves out that part of science that finds out what causes what without
manipulating, or it is too vague to be an illuminating rationale underpinning
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causal reasoning.
4 Empirical Generalisations Reassessed
This section reassesses empirical generalisations. The arguments hereby pre-
sented are built upon the same formalism typically employed by manipulationist
modellers: causal modelling (or structural modelling). First, I present causal
modelling as the answer to the same methodological challenge identified by
methodological manipulationism: how to find out what causes what. Second,
I present the variational epistemology underpinning experimental and obser-
vational methods and I show how it works within causal modelling. Third, I
develop a notion of invariance that does not necessarily require manipulation.
Let me make clear what the core of agreement with manipulationist theorists
is. I do indeed share with them the idea that empirical generalisations are
change-relating relations between variables of interest. I do also share the idea
that for empirical generalisations to be causal, they have to be invariant, albeit
in a sense that I will specify later and that does not necessarily involve the
notion of manipulation. Let me anticipate the importance of characterising
empirical generalisations as change-relating : this aspect reflects the variational
epistemology that underpins causal modelling. The full argument is given below.
Causal modelling Causal modelling (also, or alternatively, called structural
modelling) constitutes the common ground for discussion with manipulationist
theorists.3 Causal modelling is a methodology the purpose of which is to estab-
lish what causes what, in a given context. Causal modellers do so by specifying
the data-generating process (or mechanism) that accounts for the observations
in the data set. There is no need to go into technical details, especially related
to the statistical properties and tests of those models. The interested reader is
directed to Mouchart and Russo (2010); Mouchart et al. (2009); Russo (2009,
2011a); Russo et al. (2008); Wunsch (1988, 2007); Wunsch et al. (2010), besides
the well-known works of e.g. Pearl (2000) and Woodward (2003).
Causal modelling can be schematically presented as step-wise methodology.
The first step is to define the research question, the population of reference, and
the causal context, broadly conceived. This includes taking into account well-
established theories, comparative analyses, and preliminary analyses of data.
Here is an example from social science in practice. Gaume´ and Wunsch (2010)
investigate the determinants of self-rated health (i.e. of the individual’s subjec-
tive perception of his/her own overall health). The first thing they do is to
specify their research question and to define, consequently, the population of
reference and the context: they analyse data related to Baltic countries in the
Nineties, that is in a post-communist socio-political context.
3In the literature, causal and structural modelling are used intercheangeably. I am not
opposed to this practice, albeit a distinction between the two exists. ‘Causal modelling’ was
introduced by methodologists such as Blalock in the Sixties, and covered different quanti-
tative methods in social science. ‘Structural (equation) modelling’ is instead a term more
familiar to econometricians, who intended to represent, with structural equations, the ‘struc-
ture’ of phenomena as prescribed by economic theory. The two terms can be legitimately used
as synonyms insofar as causal models model mechanisms, that is causal structures (Russo,
2011a,b).
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On the basis of the outputs of step one, the second step is to give structure
to the joint probability distribution of all the variables. This means ‘breaking
down’ the joint probability distribution into smaller marginal and conditional
components. This decomposition reflects the (recursive) structure among the
variables.4 This is also called, following Blalock, the ‘conceptual model’. Con-
sider Gaume´ and Wunsch (2010) again. Simplifying things quite a lot, the
authors come up with a conceptual model where ‘Self-rated health’, the re-
sponse variable (effect), directly depend on ‘Education’, ‘Alcohol consumption’,
‘Locus of control’, ‘Psychological distress’, and ‘Physical health’. In their con-
ceptual model, there are also indirect paths, for instance from ‘Social support’
to ‘Self-rated health’ via ‘Psychological distress’—see fig. 1.
Figure 1: Determinants of self-rated health in the Baltic countries, 1994-1999.
The third step is to translate a conceptual model into an operational model.
This means choosing the variables that can be directly measured or proxies for
them, choosing the statistical model and the methods of testing. For instance,
Gaume´ and Wunsch (2010) fitted the model for four age groups (18–29, 30–44,
45–59, 60+), for both genders, for local individuals and for foreigners (mainly
Russians). The authors evaluated the model through Bayesian structural equa-
tion modelling using a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) procedure.
4It is customarily assumed that causal models are recursive, that is feedback loops are not
permitted. I do not enter here the debate on the plausibility of such assumption, nor the
debate on the methods to deal with non-recursive models.
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Once the operational model is in place, the fourth step consists in testing
the model for stability or invariance: what invariance is the matter of contro-
versy with manipulationist theorists and I thoroughly address this issue later.5
In Gaume´ and Wunsch (2010) it turned out that the determinants taken into
account (alcohol consumption, physical health, psychological health, psycholog-
ical distress, education, locus of control, and social support) had a remarkable
stable impact on self-rated health across the different Baltic countries, across
the time-frames analysed, across gender, ethnicity, or age group.
Variational epistemology In the previous section, I considered Horn (b) of
the dilemma: if we grant a charitable reading to the manipulationist approach,
it turns out that the rationale underpinning causal reasoning is misleading and
disingenous. In a nutshell, I am about to argue that the rationale underpinning
causal reasoning—both in experimental and observational methods—lies in the
notion of variation, not manipulation (for a thorough discussion, see also Russo
(2006, 2009)).
To understand what a rationale is and does, we need a brief recap on the
philosophy of causality. In the philosophy of causality, three broad areas of in-
vestigation may be distinguished: metaphysics, epistemology, and methodology.
The metaphysics of causality seeks to answer questions about what causality (or
a cause) is. It is worth noting that conceptual analysis, in attempting to pro-
vide identity conditions for causal claims, or the ultimate content of various
locutions such as ‘A causes B’, also contributes to answering questions akin
to purely metaphysical ones. The epistemology and methodology of causality,
instead, seek (i) to answer questions about how we know about causal rela-
tions and (ii) to develop or implement methods for discovery or confirmation of
causal relations. It is worth noting that the border between epistemology and
methodology is much more blurred than the border between metaphysics and
epistemology-methodology.
The quest for a rationale of causality falls within the epistemology and
methodology of causality and seeks to answer the following question. When
we reason about cause-effect relations, what notion guides this reasoning? Is it
regularity? Invariance? Production? Manipulation?
It is worth emphasising that rationale and identity conditions are not the
same thing. A rationale is a principle, notion or concept underlying some deci-
sion, reasoning, modelling, or the like. Identity conditions, instead, are condi-
tions under which a causal claim is true. According to manipulationist accounts,
for instance, ‘X causes Y is true’ if, and only if, were we to manipulate X would
yield changes to Y .
Let me now explain how the rationale of variation works. I give here just a
taste of an argument from the causal modelling methodology presented above—
the full argument, as well as other arguments, supporting the rationale of vari-
ation can be found in Russo (2009).
Causal modelling is regimented by a single rationale guiding model building
and testing: the rationale of variation. For the sake of simplicity, consider the
reduced form of a structural equation: Y = βX + , where Y is the putative
5Invariance is not the only test performed in causal models. Causal models also need to
pass tests about goodness of fit or about exogeneity. I am just keeping the discussion focused
on the controversy with manipulationist theories.
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effect, X the putative cause, β a parameter quantifying the effect of X on Y and
 represents the errors. The first question to be asked is whether the data set
reveals meaningful co-variations between X and Y . If there are such meaningful
co-variations, a second question arises: are those variations chancy or causal?
In order to assess whether co-variations between X and Y are chancy or causal,
we perform a number of tests, including (and perhaps most importantly) tests
for invariance.
It is important to notice that the causal equation above can be given a
variational and a manipulationist reading. However, whilst the former is more
basic, the latter is derived. Let me explain further. At bottom, a structural
equation is read as follows: variations in the putative cause X are accompanied
by variations in the putative effect Y . How much Y varies in response to the
variation in X is quantified by the parameter β. But this does not imply by all
means that X has been manipulated. It could well be, as is typically the case in
observational studies in social science, that statements about co-variations are
based on calculated statistical correlations between the variables. The manipu-
lationist reading is then derived from this basic variational reading as follows.
In an experimental setting, manipulations on X make X varying, such that Y
varies accordingly. In a controlled experiment, therefore, co-variations in X and
Y are due to manipulations, unlike in observational studies.6
This is all to say that variation not only guides causal reasoning in observa-
tional settings, but does so also in experimental ones. Notably, the variations
we are interested in are exactly those due to the manipulations on the putative
cause. In this sense, variation is a precondition to other notions, notably to
manipulation. This does not imply that there is no role left to manipulation,
though. Manipulation is still a tool to find out what causes what, when it can
be actually performed, but not always.
Invariance The last issue to address is what kind of invariance is needed
in order to establish whether change-relating generalisations are causal or not.
Invariance, I argue, does not require interventions strictu sensu. This means that
manipulation is not a necessary tool to establish what causes what. Instead,
what is required in absence of manipulation is that the relation between the
putative cause and effect(s) remains sufficiently stable across different partitions
of the data set or across similar populations analysed in the same study.
In Gaume´ and Wunsch (2010), no manipulation is performed. Causal as-
sessment is instead made through testing the stability of the putative causal
relationship across different ‘portions’ of the data set. The different ‘portions’
have to be carefully chosen. In fact, if we test invariance across sub-populations
randomly sampled, we should indeed expect to find, approximately, the same
values but with a larger confidence interval; consequently, this test wouldn’t
be terribly useful.7 Instead, we should appropriately choose sub-populations,
6To be sure, there is also a counterfactual reading, which is, just like the manipulationist
reading, derived from the basic variational one. Under the counterfactual reading, the equation
says that were we to change X, Y would accorning change. Notice that testing invariance
under the counterfactual reading is far from being a trivial task. Some (e.g. Psillos (2004))
have even come to the conclusion that the manipulationist account is, in this respect, parasitic
on the existence of laws of Nature, which would justify why it is the case that Ohm’s law turns
out to invariant under (counterfactual) intervention.
7Thanks to Guillaume Wunsch for drawing my attention to this point.
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for instance considering different age strata, or different socio-demo-economic
characteristics, or different geographical regions, or different time frames.
Invariance tests whether the relation between the cause-variable and the
effect-variable(s) in fact shows some ‘stability of occurrence’. In other words,
whether an empirical generalisation captures a relation between X and Y that,
in a given data set, is ‘regular enough’. Notice, however, that the kind of reg-
ularity hereby required is at variance with the ‘traditional’ Humean regularity.
In fact, invariance is not a condition of regular succession of effect-events fol-
lowing cause-events, but a condition of constancy of the characteristics of the
relation itself, notably of the causal parameters (for a discussion, see Russo
(2009, ch. 4)).
So it seems that the manipulationists’ requirement that empirical generali-
sations be invariant under intervention is, in nonexperimental contexts, pretty
strong. The reason, as we have seen, is that in those cases we cannot inter-
vene, and yet some form of invariance is required nonetheless. Some manipu-
lationist theorists, apparently, agree. According to Woodward (2003, ch. 5.8),
for instance, there are ‘possible-cause’ generalisations that state, at bottom,
that the presence of a type cause C raises the probability of an effect of type
E. One example used by Woodward is ‘Latent syphilis causes paresis’. These
‘possible-cause’ generalisations are exactly the kind of generalisations estab-
lished by means of causal models, routinely used in the special sciences. Here,
the invariance requirement is weakened (Woodward, 2003, ch. 6.15 and 7.8):
‘weak invariance’ is not to test whether the generalisation would remain stable
were we to intervene, but whether the generalisation is stable across subpopu-
lations.
To illustrate, Woodward (2003) discusses a pioneer paper on the relations
between smoking and lung cancer. Woodward notices that this paper was writ-
ten in 1959, when detailed knowledge about the biochemical mechanism through
which smoking produces cancer was still lacking. Thus, this study largely relies
on epidemiological evidence—that is observational data—and only to a lesser
extent on experimental studies of laboratory animals. Woodward then points
out that the authors do not aim to formulate ‘exceptionless generalisations’
(i.e. laws); instead they establish a causal link between smoking and lung can-
cer because the relation turns out to be invariant. What kind of invariance?
Exactly the kind of invariance discussed above, namely stability of the relation-
ship across subpopulations. Let us read the passage (Woodward, 2003, p. 312):
For example, the authors note that some association appears be-
tween smoking and lung cancer in every well-designed study on suf-
ficiently large and representative populations with which they are
familiar. There is evidence of a higher frequency of lung cancer
among smokers than among nonsmokers, when potentially confound-
ing variables are controlled for, among both men and women, among
people of different genetic backgrounds, across different diets, differ-
ent environments, and different socioeconomic conditions [. . . ]. The
precise level and quantitative details of the association do vary, for
example, the incidence of lung cancer among smokers is higher in
lower socioeconomic groups, but the fact that there is some associ-
ation or other is stable or robust across a wide variety of different
groups and background circumstances.
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The difference between the account of invariance hereby offered from the one of
the manipulationists is that invariance is not counterfactually defined, nor does
it necessarily involve manipulation. In making this move I am not claiming orig-
inality, as this kind of invariance is currently employed by practising scientists,
and was indeed envisaged by Woodward. My point in these discussions is that
non-counterfactual invariance, that is invariance not based on manipulation is
methodologically more fundamental.
To sum up. In the light of the difficulties faced by manipulationism, empirical
generalisations need to be reassessed. I carried over from the manipulation-
ist account the idea that empirical generalisations are change-relating relations
between variables. I then proposed that the question of whether empirical gen-
eralisations are causal or not is settled by testing a condition of invariance that
does not take manipulation as methodologically fundamental. It is in fact not
manipulation that provides the rationale underpinning both observational and
experimental methods for causal inference, but rather the notion of variation.
5 Conclusion
Manipulationist approaches hold the view that information about the outcomes
of interventions are needed for a variety of scientific purposes, e.g. causal as-
sessment or explanation. This paper narrowed down the scope to the role of
manipulation for causal assessment rather than explanation. The solution given
by manipulationist theorists is that an empirical generalisation between X and
Y is causal insofar as it is invariant under intervention. That is, an empirical
generalisation is causal if, and only if, the relationship between X and Y is
invariant under intervention, and it is not disrupted as a consequence of such
intervention.
I argued, however, that manipulationim is trapped in a dilemma. The ma-
nipulationist project can in fact be read in two ways. On the one hand (Horn
1), if the project is given a conceptual reading, then it appears to be unillu-
minating from a methodological point of view. On the other hand (Horn 2),
if the project is given a methodological reading, then a second dilemma opens
up. If methodological manipulationism is strictly interpreted (Horn (a)), then it
fails to provide the methodology for observational studies. Or, if it is charitably
interpreted (Horn (b)), then the requirement of manipulation becomes so vague
and weak as to be not only unilluminating, but also misleading in providing a
rationale for causal reasoning in either experimental or observational studies.
In the light of the previous discussion, I reassessed empirical generalisations.
Empirical generalisations, I argued, are indeed change-relating (or, variation-
relating) relations—this is the core of agreement with manipulationist theorists.
The importance of such characterisation of empirical generalisation is that it
mirrors the rationale underpinning both experimental and observational studies:
it is the notion of variation—not manipulation—that guides causal reasoning.
I also agree that for empirical generalisations to be causal, they have to be
invariant. Yet, the kind of invariance needed does not take manipulation as
methodologically fundamental.
The broad conclusion to be drawn is that manipulation is not the building
block of causal assessment. Manipulation is certainly a good tool, when it can be
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performed, but not always. In other words, there is still room for sound causal
assessment in the absence of manipulation. Granted, it is no surprise that,
ceteris paribus, manipulations give us higher confidence in causal assessment.
But the ceteris paribus clause is important. Well designed observational studies
may deliver more reliable results than poorly designed controlled experiments.
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